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Clausewitz, still the Master of War? On 




Abstract This article is concerned with the work of the Prussian soldier and 
philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831). The article examines 
recent developments in debates about the cotemporary relevance of 
Clausewitz for strategic thought. The piece surveys the history of 
misperception and misinterpretation directed at Clausewitz since his death in 
1831 as a prelude to arguing for his continued relevance. It argues that much 
of the criticism directed at Clausewitz is prompted not by any real 
demonstration of his obsolescence, but is more often rooted in a visceral 
dislike of past proponents of Clausewitz for their aggressive and militaristic 
policies. Only an appreciation of the history of the misappropriation of, and 
the misconceptions surrounding, has the added advantage of assisting the 
reader in his/her interpretation of Clausewitz. Clausewitz’s Universalist 
appeal renders him more useful than ever in the twenty-first century, an era 
of globalisation and fragmentation.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
‘Clausewitz’s greatest lesson for my profession was that the soldier, for all his 
patriotism, valor, and skill, forms just one leg in a triad. Without all three legs engaged, 
the military, the government, and the people, the enterprise cannot stand.’ General Colin 
L. Powell, United States Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989-93.1 
 
‘You will be horrified to hear that I have never read Clausewitz or Delbrück or 
Haushofer. The opinion on Clausewitz in our general staff was that of a theoretician to 
be read by professors.’ Former German General Leo Geyr von Sherpenberg to Basil H. 
Liddell Hart, 24 September 1961.2 
 
In the nineteenth century the philosophies of the Prussian military thinker Carl von Clausewitz 
(1780-1831) became a canon of faith amongst all the world’s leading militaries. The holy book 
of this enduring faith was (and is) Clausewitz’s posthumously-published book, Vom Kreige 
(On War). Today, interest in Clausewitz shows no sign of abating and the latest renaissance in 
Clausewitzian studies has been spearheaded by many eminent scholars.3 A large proportion of 
                                                 
1 Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, A Soldier’s Way: An Autobiography (London: Hutchinson, 1995), p. 208. 
2 Williamson Murray, ‘A Whale against an Elephant; Britain and Germany’ in James Lacey (ed.), Great Strategic 
Rivalries: From the Classical World to the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 604 (n.9). 
3 See, for instance, Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Andreas. Clausewitz’s Puzzle: The Political Theory of War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007); Jan Willem Honig, ‘Clausewitz’s On War: Problems of text and translation’ in 
Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Andreas, Jan Willem Honig and Daniel Moran (eds), Clausewitz: The State and War 
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2011), pp. 55-73; Patrick Porter, ‘Good anthropology, bad history: the cultural 
turn in studying war.’ Parameters, 37/2 (2007), pp. 45-58; Beatrice Heuser, ‘Clausewitz’s Ideas of Strategy and 
Victory’ in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds), Clausewitz in the Twenty First Century (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 138-62; Beatrice Heuser, The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from 
Antiquity to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Hew Strachan, Clausewitz’s On War: 
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the scholarly debates on Clausewitz continue to revolve around the question of whether he is 
still ‘relevant’.4 And some scholars have built their careers on critiquing Clausewitz. The Israeli 
scholar Martin van Creveld, for instance, did just that in his 1991 text On Future War - 
advertised as ‘The most radical reinterpretation of armed conflict since Clausewitz’. Van 
Creveld cast doubt on Clausewitz’s contemporary relevance because On War, as with all 
‘classical strategy’, was held to be the ‘product of specific periods and circumstances.’5 (That 
said, van Creveld still rated Clausewitz’s On War ‘The second best book on war ever written’!)6 
The military historian John Keegan, on the other hand, had little of van Creveld’s even-
handedness and his views on Clausewitz has provoked reactions on several occasions.7 
 
In truth, many of those who deny the applicability to his theories in the twenty-first century 
have an agenda to undermine Clausewitz as they believe that his predominance has normalised 
and even promoted war as a viable policy option. Following his death from typhoid in 1831, 
the subsequent deification of Clausewitz as a strategist was due, not least, to the outstanding 
success of Prussian arms in the three wars of German unification between 1864 and 1871.8 
Henceforward, Clausewitz’s star rose in tandem with that of the new Imperial German army as 
the latter became acknowledged as the leading national exponent of the martial arts. In short, 
Clausewitz and the Prussian-German military system became a model that was universally 
admired.9 (Some armies even adopted the spiked helmet, the Pickelhaube, and the ‘goose-step’ 
(Stechschritt) drill-march). Signally, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, chief of staff of the 
Prussian/German army between 1857 and 1888, described Clausewitz as ‘the military mind 
which most influenced my work.’10 In truth, Otto von Bismarck, Minister President of Prussia 
from 1862 to 1890,11 had only resorted to conflict with extreme reluctance: ‘I would have 
grasped at any solution that led to the expansion of Prussia and German unity without war.’12 
Yet, when we recall the foundation of the Second Reich, we remember Bismarck’s self-
declared policy of ‘Blood and Iron’, and the success of German arms, we forget Bismarck’s 
aversion to war except as a last resort. Such a policy would have found favour with Clausewitz 
himself.   
 
                                                 
A Biography (London: Atlantic Books, 2007); and Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ‘Introduction’ in 
Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds), Clausewitz in the Twenty First Century (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 1-13. 
4 For an example of an article assessing the debates on the contemporary relevance of Clausewitz, see Colin M. 
Fleming, ‘New or Old Wars? Debating a Clausewitzian Future.’ Journal of Strategic Studies, 32/2 (2009), pp. 
213-41.  
5 Martin van Creveld, On Future War (London: Brassey’s, 1991), p. 206.  
6 Van Creveld, On Future War, p. 231. 
7 See, for example, Christopher Bassford, ‘John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz’, War in 
History, 1/3 (1994), pp. 319–36. 
8 On these, see Dennis E. Showalter, The Wars of German Unification (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2nd rev. 
edn. 2015). 
9 R. Gerald Hughes, ‘War as Political Violence’ in Marie Breen-Smyth (ed.) The Ashgate Research Companion to 
Political Violence (Farnham (UK): Ashgate, 2012), pp. 355-6. 
10 Van Creveld, On Future War, p. 34. 
11 Bismarck was also Chancellor of the German Empire between 1871 and 1890. On this era, see Gordon A. Craig, 
Germany, 1866-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, rev. edn. 1981), pp. 61-179. 
12 Marcus Jones, ‘Strategy as Character: Bismarck and the Prusso-German Question, 1862–1878’ in Williamson 
Murray, Richard Hart Sinnreich and James Lacey (eds), The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy, and 
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 86. 
3 | P a g e  
 
Bismarck had been all too aware of the danger of using war to achieve national goals.13 His 
successors, most notably Wilhelm II and Hitler, were not. In crude terms, it was often asserted 
that, after Bismarck departed the scene in 1890, the leadership of Germany disastrously 
neglected many fundamentals pertaining to the conduct of politics and war.14 Clausewitz was 
no longer read, and his insistence that political ends should drive military strategy was turned 
on its head as the German army insisted that ‘military necessity’ should drive policy and 
strategy.15 This did not prevent British commentators from attaching Clausewitz to any 
unpleasant German practice. During the Anglo-Irish War (1919-21), the MP Oswald Moseley 
denounced the policy of official British government reprisals as being ‘copied and taken en 
bloc from the doctrines of the German military…[and] closely pursued by that nation 
throughout the War.’ For Moseley, British policy in Ireland was ‘the old, well-known system, 
outlined in the doctrines of Clausewitz and others, of collective punishment.’16 But the 
widespread notion that Clausewitzian method was effective, if barbaric, was undermined by 
the shattering defeats of the German state in two world wars. These destroyed the Universal 
admiration for the German military machine. After 1918 Imperial Germany, it was 
acknowledged, had achieved amazing feats of arms, but had entirely neglected the relationship 
between (military) means and (political) ends. Germany had embarked up multi-front wars 
against multiple opponents with violence as an end in itself.17 In all probability, Clausewitz 
would never have endorsed such a strategy but he was now (wrongly) dismissed as a nihilistic 
advocate of aggressive war for its own sake, found himself indicted as the progenitor of the 
endlessly destructive mindset of German militarism.18 A number of the scholarly pieces on 
Clausewitz engage in counterfactual speculation. Some writers have set up debates on real life 
case studies: viz. effectively asking the question What would Clausewitz have done?19  
  
A major problem for Clausewitzian thinking, as with the concept of appeasement, undoubtedly 
lies in the association with the person of Adolf Hitler.20 Until recently scholars usually asserted 
that, despite the board brush of Nazi progenitor applied to Clausewitz, there was no real 
                                                 
13 Jones, ‘Strategy as Character’, pp. 109-10. On the limited political utility of war for the European state in the 
Bismarckian era, see Karl-Ernst Jeismann, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges im europäischen Staatensystem: 
mit besonderem Blick auf die Bismarckzeit (Freiburg and Munich: Karl Alber, 1957).  
14 In his history of Germany Gordon Craig wrote: ‘When the great star fell, many Germans had a chilling 
presentiment that their country had suffered an irreplaceable loss governed with such intelligence and assurance. 
Time was to prove them correct…’. Craig, Germany, 1866-1945, p. 178. 
15 Murray, ‘A Whale against an Elephant; Britain and Germany’, pp. 372-3. 
16 Hansard, HC Deb, 5th Series, volume 142, column 1174, 1 June 1921. 
17 On this, see Michael Geyer, ‘German Strategy in the Age of Machine Warfare, 1914-1945’ in Peter Paret (ed.), 
with Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2nd edn. 1986), pp. 527-97. 
18 On Clausewitz, ‘The Apostle of Total War: 1914-1945’, see Christopher Bassford, Clausewitz in English: The 
Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America, 1815-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 113-
94. 
19 In his recent book, Christopher Coker constructs three fictional scenarios. The first one places Clausewitz in a 
seminar at the United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point; the second one sees his debate the course 
of post-2001 ‘War on Terror’ at an imaginary think-tank in Washington DC; and, the third scenario envisages his 
participation in a lively seminar concerned with a Hegelian-type debate on the utility of reading history. This third 
exchange is situated at a meeting of the Military History Circle in London. See Christopher Coker, Rebooting 
Clausewitz: On War in the 21st Century (London: Hurst & Company, 2017). In his recent piece, Honig constructed 
a transcript of an imaginary between Clausewitz and himself. See Jan Willem Honig, ‘A Brief Encounter with 
Major-General Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831).’ In Richard Ned Lebow, Peer Schouten and Hidemi Suganami 
(eds), The Return of the Theorists:  Dialogues with Great Thinkers (Basingstoke (UK): Palgrave Macmillan, 
2016), pp. 126-33. 
20 On this, see Norbert Krueger, ‘Adolf Hitler Clausewitzknettness’, Wissenschaft Rundschau, 18 (1968), pp. 467-
71. 
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evidence that Hitler ever studied Clausewitz in any depth.21 (And Clausewitz most assuredly 
did not advocate aggressive racial wars and endless expansionism as state policy). It is true that 
the standard English translation of Mein Kampf makes only two (banal) direct references to 
Clausewitz,22 but editors of the authoritative recent version in the original German highlight 
portions of the book where Hitler was clearly influenced by Clausewitz (‘with whose writings 
Hitler repeatedly engaged’).23 Signally, Karl Haushofer testified in 1945 that, in 1924, he had 
introduced Rudolf Hess to Clausewitz and Ratzel.24 This tends to support the notion that Hitler 
was familiar with Clausewitz (due to Hess’s close relationship with Hitler at the time).25 This 
view had been strengthened by Hitler’s political testament, dictated on 29 April 1945, and 
which was widely publicised after his death. In this document, Hitler urged the German people 
to continue the struggle, after his death, ‘against the enemies of the Fatherland, no matter 
where, true to the creed of the great Clausewitz.’26 The notion of Hitler as Clausewitz devotee 
was encouraged by the statements of individuals like Ernst ‘Putzi’ Hanfstaengl, a onetime 
confidante of Hitler, who later wrote that Hitler’s ‘other politico-military master was 
Clausewitz, whom he could quote by the yard’.27 Hitler undoubtedly got a great deal wrong in 
his reading of Clausewitz (not least in seeing confirmation in his works of the danger of a ‘drop 
of poison in the blood of a people’ undermining racial purity).28 Konrad Heiden, a journalist 
who wrote an early biography of Hitler, noted that while the German General Hans von Seeckt 
followed the Clausewitizian notion that the aim of war was peace, Hitler saw no difference 
between the two as ‘There is always struggle.’29 The editors of the 2017 edition of Mein Kampf 
nevertheless assert that many of Hitler’s thoughts and statements were inspired by Clausewitz 
(for instance: ‘[t]he war leader who takes no risks gains no prize’).30 Maybe so, but the notion 
that Clausewitz had advocated unlimited aggressive wars against multiple opponents (as was 
the case in 1914-8 and 1939-45) was, and is, nonsensical. But, as with Martin Luther, Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Richard Wagner, Clausewitz was deemed a source of intellectual inspiration for 
the murderous racial empire of the Nazis.31 (And, as with all such figures, it seems likely that 
any of Hitler’s familiarity with Clausewitz was derived from cheap popular pamphlets).32 In 
such circumstances, it seemed unlikely that Clausewitz’s reputation would ever fully recover. 
In the event, like the German nation itself, Clausewitz made a remarkable recovery after 
Germany’s stunde null. 
 
After the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, militarism was utterly discredited as a 
basis for national policy. By association, however mistakenly constructed, this impacted upon 
                                                 
21 Wallach, ‘Misperceptions of Clausewitz’ On War by the German Military’, 218-9. 
22 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim; intro. D.C. Watt (London: Pimlico, 1994), pp. 610, 612. 
23 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf: Eine kritische Edition, edited by Christian Hartmann, Othmar Plöckinger, Roman 
Töppel, and Thomas Vordermayer (Munich: Institut für Zeitgeschichte/ Berlin IfZ, 2017), p.1018 (n.47). 
24 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 2017, p. 394 (n.72). 
25 Hitler dictated Mein Kampf to Hess whilst in Landsberg prison. Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1889-1936: Hubris 
(London, Allen Lane, 1998), p. 242. 
26 Adolf Hitler, ‘My Political Testament’, 29 April 1945. Jeremy Noakes (ed.). Nazism 1919-1945, Volume 4, The 
German Home Front in World War II: A Documentary Reader (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1998), p. 669. 
27 Ernst Hanfstaengl, Unheard Witness (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1957), p. 41. 
28 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 2017, p. 1693. 
29 Konrad Heiden, The Fuehrer, trans. Ralph Mannheim (London: Robinson, 1999 [1944]), p. 248. 
30 Conversation of 25 August 1942. Hitler’s Table Talk, 1941-1944: His Private Conversations, intro. H.R. 
Trevor-Roper, trans. Norman Cameron and R.H. Stevens (London: Phoenix, 2000 [1953]), p. 659. Hitler, Mein 
Kampf, 2017, p. 1269 (n.7). Hitler’s words are rendered here as ‘Whoever does not take risks in the pursuit of war 
can achieve nothing.’ 
31 P.M. Baldwin, ‘Clausewitz in Nazi Germany’, Journal of Contemporary History, 16/1 (1981), p. 6. 
32 Heiden, The Fuehrer, p. 297. 
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negatively upon Clausewitz’s reputation in the United States, Britain and elsewhere.33 
However, the idea that Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan had followed the ideas espoused in 
On War as a template for their pursuit of their wars of aggression, is not borne out by an 
examination of the central tenets of Clausewitz’s thinking.34 Indeed, the eminent British 
strategist Colin Gray utilised German policy in both World Wars, and Japan’s decision to attack 
the United States in 1941, as ‘negative illustration[s] of the wisdom in the Clausewitzian 
explanation of the proper connection between politics and war.’ In ‘great war after great war 
Germany effectively lost the political plot…[waging] warfare more as an end in itself than for 
reasonable and plausibly attainable political objectives.’ Imperial Japan’s 1941 decision to 
attack the United States ‘for limited, albeit ambitious, goals’ was an ‘error of stunning 
magnitude’.35  
 
Clausewitz had specifically warned that offensives always lost momentum as they were 
weakened by the very act of the advance.36  This phenomenon was partly down to what 
Clausewitz termed ‘friction’.37 (‘Friction…is the force that makes the apparent easy so 
difficult.’)38 Indeed, as Humboldt University’s Rolf-Dieter Müller notes, the invasion of Poland 
in 1939, whilst appearing to represent an ‘easy’ German victory, had already demonstrated a 
significantly higher level of ‘friction’ than had been anticipated.39 Despite this, planning for 
Operation Barbarossa (the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany in June 1941) 
seemed to involve minimal discussion of the ‘friction’ that would undoubtedly arise in such a 
venture.40 Erich von Manstein, regarded as Germany’s ablest strategist in the Second World 
War, blames Hitler and charges him with violating Clausewitzian notions of the balance 
between political ends and military means: ‘his political measures in the east ran entirely 
counter to the requirements of his strategy, depriving it whatever chance it may have of a 
speedy victory.’41 In truth, German planning was flawed at a more fundamental level. And, 
whilst acknowledging Hitler’s mistakes, the German army certainly cannot be absolved of 
blame. David Stahel recently framed a monograph on German planning for Operation 
Barbarossa around a fatal violation of a basic principle of Clausewitz’s philosophy of war.  
 
A short explanation of Germany’s defeat in [1941] might best be provided 
by a simple theoretical concept devised by the renowned German strategist 
and historian Carl von Clausewitz. Based in large part on his first-hand 
observations of the Napoleonic wars, Clausewitz’s timeless study Vom 
Kriege (On War) established numerous maxims of war, which in many cases 
                                                 
33 Bassford, Clausewitz in English, pp. 197-200.  
34 On Clausewitz and the Third Reich, see Baldwin, ‘Clausewitz in Nazi Germany’, 5-26. 
35 Colin S. Gray, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History (London: 
Routledge, 2nd edn. 2012), p. 25.   
36 Frank McLynn, Napoleon: A Biography (London: Pimlico, 1998), pp. 375-6. McLynn asserts that Napoleon’s 
advance deep into Russia in 1812 conformed to Clausewitz’s dictum that to advance deep into enemy territory 
represents a kind of defeat. It is clear what Clausewitz would have made of Hitler’s decision to attack the Soviet 
Union and Japan’s attempt to create a ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’ in June and December 1941, 
respectively.     
37 Rolf-Dieter Müller, Der Feind steht im Osten: Hitlers geheime Pläne für einen Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion im 
Jahr 1939 (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2011), p. 61.  
38 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Introductory essays by Peter 
Paret, Michael Howard and Bernard Brodie. Commentary by Bernard Brodie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1984 (1976)), p. 121. 
39 Müller, Der Feind steht im Osten, p. 173. 
40 Müller, Der Feind steht im Osten, p. 238. 
41 Erich von Manstein, trans. and ed. Anthony G. Powell; intro. Martin Blumeson; foreword by B.H. Liddell-Hart, 
Lost Victories (London: Greenhill Books, 1987 (1955/1958)), p. 176. 
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are still upheld today. Clausewitz’s theory of the culminating point of the 
attack provides a useful intellectual framework through which to view 
Operation Barbarossa. Put simply, Clausewitz established that most attacks 
diminish in strength the longer they continue, whereupon a critical point is 
eventually reached at which the power of the attack is superseded by the 
strength of the defence. This he determined to be the culminating point or 
climax of the attack, which he then added was usually, but not always, 
followed by an extremely powerful enemy counter-blow. This basic 
hypothesis formed an intriguing theoretical starting point for my own 
questioning of the literature concerning Operation Barbarossa and posed the 
problem of whether it was possible to pre-date the German military failure in 
1941. As a result, Clausewitz’s culminating point formed a conceptual 
beginning to what I believe subsequent research has confirmed - that German 
operations in the east had failed by the middle of August 1941.42 
 
After 1945, Clausewitz’s name was a dirty word and matched by the reputation of the German 
people, which was at a historical nadir.43 In wartime Allied works on Germany, Clausewitz 
was lumped in with some fairly unsavoury characters. In 1943 Julius Braunthal, an Austrian-
born Jewish socialist, wrote that: ‘The complex of ideas commonly denounced as German 
thought should rather be termed Prussian tradition’. This included Friedrich von Bernhardi, 
Heinrich von Treitschke, Clausewitz and the Pan-German League, all of whom ‘expressed 
accurately the ideology of a considerable proportion of the German people.’44 And yet, by 
putting ideology aside, the Soviets recognised enough virtue in Clausewitz to exploit him for 
propaganda purposes for the Committee for a Free Germany (formed from German prisoners 
after the defeat at Stalingrad in 1943). In this narrative Clausewitz, along with other Prussian 
reformers such as Yorck, Stein and Gneisenau, was lauded for their refusal to participate in 
Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812.45 This was hardly the view of Prussian militarism 
prevailing in Britain, however. In the opinion of Lord Vansittart,46 a senior diplomat and an 
arch-enemy of Germany,47 the person of Clausewitz and the mass of the German people were 
synonymous. In the House of Lords, he duly identified three goals vis-à-vis defeated Germany. 
 
[F]irst, to bring home to the German nation a sense of national responsibility; 
secondly, to ensure that at some distant date the German people should not 
be told that all these abominations were just a fiction of Allied propaganda; 
and thirdly, if possible - I say “if possible” - to ensure a national repentance. 
If we could secure that, it would indeed be a great safeguard for the future. 
But we shall most certainly not succeed in that object unless we realize that 
we are dealing not with isolated phenomena but with a continuity. All modern 
Germanity is a continuity. Great cruelties were perpetrated in the last war and 
                                                 
42 David Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany’s Defeat in the East (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), p. 3. 
43 It was at this time that Alan Taylor published his infamous history of modern Germany. See A.J.P. Taylor, The 
Course of German History: Survey of the Development of German History Since 1815 (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1945). 
44 Julius Braunthal, Need Germany Survive? (London: Victor Gollancz for the Left Book Club, 1943), p. 66. 
45 Christopher Clark, Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600-1947 (London: Penguin, 2007), p. 
674. 
46 Robert Vansittart (1881-1957), 1st Baron Vansittart from 1941, was a senior British diplomat before and during 
the Second World War. 
47 On this, see especially Sir Robert Vansittart, Black Record: Germans Past and Present (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1941).  
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they were due to a very simple cause. All students of German political and 
military literature will realize that the theme of ruthlessness and its extension 
frightfulness was heavily plugged throughout the latter part of the nineteenth 
century and the earlier part of the twentieth century. Illustrations of course 
abound. I will just take one of the most impressive ones. In October, 1870, 
Bismarck declared that every French village where resistance was offered 
should be gutted, to use his exact word, and all the male population hanged. 
The story goes back a good deal further than that. It goes back to Clausewitz. 
He was also an apostle of thoroughness.48 
 
For many observers, Clausewitz was now not only immoral, he was obsolete. Three months 
after the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, the Labour MP Major Donald Bruce told the 
House of Commons: ‘The old diplomacy is completely dead. With the coming of the atomic 
bomb, we could, if we wished, tear up completely Clausewitz’s classic “On War.”’49 But, 
gradually, and from a lowly reputational base, Clausewitz was to experience a renaissance of 
remarkable longevity. In the United States during the 1950s, the strategy of nuclear deterrence 
developed as per President Eisenhower’s reading of Clausewitz as an army officer after the 
First World War.50 Eisenhower was intrigued by Clausewitz’s denial of the possibility of 
‘absolute war’ and whether, or not, the advent of nuclear weapons had changed the fundamental 
nature of major power conflict.51 The Eisenhower administration thus significantly expanded 
the US nuclear arsenal to give credence to the doctrine of ‘Massive retaliation’ (a phrase coined 
by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a speech of January 1954).52 In a nuclear age, so 
the thinking went, no opponent would risk an ‘absolute war’ with the United States.53 US 
nuclear strategy was bolstered by academic Neo-Clausewitizians, such as Henry A. Kissinger 
and Raymond Aron, who sought to rationalise (to critics, ‘normalise’) nuclear weapons in terms 
of traditional power politics.54 The nuclear strategist Herman Kahn made clear his 
Clausewitzian lineage by titling his 1960 book On Thermonuclear War55 (although it seems 
likely that he was barely familiar with On War).56 In 1962, Kahn published a book urging that 
mankind plan seriously for nuclear war because of the necessity of ‘thinking the unthinkable’.57 
Some claimed that Clausewitz had never intended his ideas to be interpreted thus, whilst others 
recoiled in horror from what they saw as a typically Clausewitzian amoral recipe for suicide. 
In 1968, the American biologist, musician, and game-theorist Anatol Rapoport observed of the 
Neo-Clausewitzians that ‘In the name of realism they perpetuate an obsolete collective state of 
mind which has brought humanity to the brink of disaster.’58  
 
                                                 
48 Hansard, HL Deb, 5th Series, volume 136, columns 75-6, 1 May 1945. 
49 Hansard, HC Deb, 5th Series, volume 415, column 1323, 7 November 1945. 
50 Van Creveld, On Future War, p. 34. 
51 Bassford, Clausewitz in English, pp. 157-62. 
52 Fred Kaplan, foreword by Martin J. Sherwin, The Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1991 (1983)), pp. 174-5. 
53 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 
233-4. 
54 See, for instance, Henry A. Kissinger, foreword by Gordon Dean, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations/Harper & Brothers, 1957); and Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of 
International Relations (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966). 
55 Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960). 
56 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) p. 160. 
57 Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1962).  
58 Anatol Rapoport, ‘Introduction’, Carl von Clausewitz, ed. and intro. Anatol Rapoport, On War (London: 
Penguin, 1968), p. 80. 
8 | P a g e  
 
In the United States, Clausewitz experienced an upswing in influence following that country’s 
defeat in the Vietnam War.59 For an American military establishment in deep institutional 
shock, Clausewitz’s theories provided a blueprint for starting over again with a rethink of the 
meaning, and formulation, of strategy.60 In 1982, Colonel Harry Summers Jr., a veteran of 
Korea and Vietnam (and professor at the US Army War College), published his influential 
Clausewitzian take on recent history: On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War.61 
Two years later, the US Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, enunciated the so-called 
Weinberger Doctrine. In his announcement, Weinberger stated that the US would not go to war 
unless several conditions were met. This entailed a continual reassessment of the relationship 
between objectives and military capabilities; a clear intention of winning; an assurance of 
support from the American people and Congress; and war must be a last resort. Having 
subscribed wholeheartedly to Clausewitzian thought, Weinberger then quoted him directly. ‘As 
Clausewitz wrote, ‘No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without 
first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to 
conduct it.’’62 By 1990 Summers could observe that ‘What we found to our amazement is that 
Clausewitz spoke almost directly to the American experience, like no one else did’.63 In 1995, 
Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford opined that ‘Our military educators’ often 
annoying fixation on Clausewitz’s work has brought a much-needed professional 
sophistication to the thinking of America’s military institutions in the generation since 
Vietnam. There is nothing better on the horizon.’64 In 1999, the Conservative Peer Lord 
Burnham attacked the NATO intervention in Kosovo, invoking Clausewitz.   
 
Nearly 200 years after Clausewitz educated the world in the principles of 
warfare, it is still necessary to quote him to solve our political problems. At 
the beginning of the crisis in Kosovo the leaders of all the countries which 
were to be involved should have been repeating Clausewitz, as Sir Michael 
Howard emphasised, when he said, “Nobody starts a war, or rather no one in 
his senses should do so, unless he knows what he intends to achieve by it”. 
There is little doubt that the NATO countries failed adequately to think 
through the consequences of their actions.65 
 
Michael Handel, Professor of Naval Strategy at the US Naval War College until his death in 
2001, and one of Clausewitz’s most important modern advocates, was insistent upon the 
contemporary relevance of Clausewitz. ‘In a time when many military men and strategists tend 
to regard material and technological factors as a panacea, Clausewitz’s…observations serve as 
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9 | P a g e  
 
increasingly important caveats.’66 Colin Powell typified the attitudes of many of his 
contemporaries when he wrote that the work of ‘That wise Prussian Karl [sic] von Clausewitz 
was an awakening for me.’67 Vietnam, it seemed, was an object lesson in everything that 
Clausewitz had warned against. His maxims and theories seemed eminently suitable for a 
nuclear Superpower, nearly one hundred and fifty years after his death. The argument ran that 
the US attempt to ‘save’ South Vietnam had neglected Clausewitz’s insistence that one must 
not begin a war without knowing exactly who you were fighting and for exactly what political 
objective. To ensure success, the state’s political leadership must not only dictate a central war 
aim that its military must pursue, but the people of the state must also support the war 
wholeheartedly. One does not need to be a brilliant strategist to note the dislocation between 
these three elements in the history of the US involvement with Vietnam. Ideally, while the 
armed forces seek to achieve clearly-identifiable objections, the population must also 
contribute to the war. In Vietnam, the politicians did not know the capabilities and limits of its 
military; the military did not know what its primary objective was; and the population came to 
increasingly distrust its leaders and fear that its military was waging an aggressive, unnecessary 
and barbaric war.68 The United States had a real problem: how does one translate overwhelming 
power into an ability to attain political goals by military means? This problem persists to this 
day, as the post-2001 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate. Yet, despite persuasive 
counterfactuals based around the notion that ‘Clausewitz would have not lost in Vietnam’, the 
Prussian’s detractors remained unimpressed. To their mind, it was a Clausewitzian mindset, a 
belief in the utility of war as a policy instrument, which lay at the heart of the US decision to 
intervene in Vietnam and in the subsequent excesses committed in South-East Asia. Clausewitz 
acknowledged that policy could be an alien element in war.69 In major conflicts, as one might 
expect, war and policy are synonymous but the scope for divergence in ‘limited’ or so-called 
‘discretionary’ wars is all too real.70 In 2009 Stephen L. Melton wrote a polemic decrying the 
Clausewitzian roots of failure in Afghanistan and Iraq.    
 
The historicism of Clausewitz has served us poorly in the thirty years since 
military theoreticians made him the centrepiece of our new joint doctrine. 
Center of gravity analysis confounds military planners and leads only to 
wishful thinking, implicit in our doctrine, that a general’s strategies and 
decisive battles can reduce or avoid the need for attrition warfare. There is 
no historical proof of such a claim.71  
 
This attack on ‘historicism’ rather neglects the Universal as envisaged by Clausewitz. And 
here, the most well-known theoretical model employed by Clausewitz (the ‘paradoxical trinity’ 
of ‘primordial violence, hatred, and enmity’), although explicitly mentioned on only one page 
of On War,72 is crucial to understanding his thinking. Peter Paret has asserted that ‘[r]eal war, 
Clausewitz declared, was a composite of three elements: violence and passion; the scope 
afforded by all human intercourse to chance and probability, but also to genius, intelligence, 
[and] courage; and its subordination to politics, which, Clausewitz characteristically argued, 
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made it subject to reason.’73 Thomas Waldman recently observed that ‘Context, properly 
understood, is not part of the nature of war itself, but that nature, as expressed in the trinity, 
cannot be understood without reference to context, as it helps us explain why war’s nature 
manifests itself in divergent ways throughout history.’74 Crucially, and in order to grasp this, 
one needs excellent intelligence. When General Stanley McChrystal ordered his chief 
intelligence officer in Afghanistan, General Michael Flynn, to assess the situation on the 
ground there in 2009, his report was scathing: ‘eight years into the war in Afghanistan the U.S. 
intelligence community is only marginally relevant to the overall strategy’.75 A year later, 
Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University, 
published a celebrated book about intelligence failure. Jervis acknowledged that the US 
Intelligence Community’s (IC) strong point was its ability to convey a great deal of information 
to policymakers quickly and concisely. Jervis was, nevertheless, struck by ‘the bland writing 
style that often buries the important [points]’ and thus inhibits analysis through opacity.76 Both 
Flynn and Jervis highlighted two problems: viz. the reduced strategic relevance of the US IC; 
and exactly how intelligence agencies deal with the inevitable uncertainty in their line of work. 
Both concerns are age-old and are the very essence of war as a societal activity.  
 
Intelligence is such an important part of the national security state today, and Clausewitz is 
often denigrated for being too dismissive of intelligence as a war-fighting asset. This is a point 
usually made by means of the quotation of well-worn Clausewitzian maxims, especially: 
‘Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain 
... In short, most intelligence is false, and the effect of fear is to multiply lies and 
inaccuracies’.77 If he were alive today, the massive technological advances that have afforded 
modern intelligence such impressive capabilities would surely be embraced by Clausewitz,78 
while his paradox would remain intact. The misperception of Clausewitz here is entirely 
typical: he remains one of the misquoted figures in history. In 2007, Hew Strachan noted that 
‘[t]hose who blamed Clausewitz for the slaughter of the First World War were not guilty of 
finding things in the text of On War that were not there.’79 Strachan developed this theme in 
the 2010 George C. Marshall Lecture in Military History when he argued that that English-
language authors had blamed Clausewitz twice over for the supposed role of his writings in the 
First World War. Basil Liddell Hart ascribed the notion of ‘absolute war’, embraced by all of 
the major powers’ general staffs, to Clausewitz.80 In 1931 Liddell Hart had written that 
‘Clausewitz had proclaimed the sovereign virtues of the will to conquer, the unique value of 
the offensive carried out with unlimited violence by a nation in arms and the power of the 
military action to override everything else. He had argued that to overthrow the main enemy in 
battle should be the primary aim.’81 Strachan notes that later writers depicted the First World 
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War as lacking any coherent political rationale and so contradicting the most well-known of 
the dictums outlined in On War.  
 
In damning the generals of the First World War…Liddell Hart set in train a 
debate from which all subsequent English-language writing has struggled 
vainly to escape. John Keegan and David Stevenson are but the latest in a 
line of succession from Liddell Hart in their portrayal of the war in terms of 
waste, futility, and meaninglessness. The irony is that, although Keegan and 
Stevenson have this view in common with Liddell Hart, they base it on a 
diametrically opposed interpretation of Clausewitz. Liddell Hart appeared 
oblivious to the fact that Clausewitz ever even mentioned the relationship 
between war and policy. Too many recent historians seem to be unaware that 
he ever wrote about anything else.82 
 
In 1990, John E. Shepherd had stressed the necessity of avoiding such misjudgements for 
readers of Clausewitz, noting that ‘modern soldiers and statesmen cannot redeem the full value 
of Clausewitz's legacy if they fail to subject his propositions to serious debate.’  
 
Unfortunately, Clausewitz is more often quoted than read, more venerated 
than understood. Many of his ideas on the purposes, nature, and conduct of 
war have been reduced to mere aphorisms to decorate the pages of field 
manuals. Clausewitz would hardly be pleased by this sort of idolatry. As an 
empiricist who tried to develop his theory scientifically, he was acutely aware 
of the need to test his hypotheses against reality. When the realities of warfare 
change over time, then old, previously accepted hypotheses need retesting 
and, if necessary, modification.83  
 
Clausewitz continues to figure in debates on strategy and his relevance is often called into 
question. Antulio Echevarria notes that the essential elements of war are unchanged since 
Clausewitz’s time, although he pointedly states that ‘Anything that stands or falls principally 
on the notion of relevance is likely to have a brief shelf life, especially in an era where change 
appears ever more rapid.’84 Clausewitz is nonetheless often dismissed for his state-centric 
worldview by critics who cite technological advances, information war, proxy wars, and the 
importance of non-state actors as proof of the manner in which war has been fundamentally 
transformed since Clausewitz’s lifetime.85 Some of Clausewitz’s critics undoubtedly make 
very eloquent cases. Anatol Rapoport, for instance, argued that, in a nuclear age, a 
Clausewitzian view of war was obsolete and highly dangerous promoting, as it did, a zero-sum 
notion of international politics, whilst undermining rational thinking amongst policymakers.86 
This view is far from prevalent and has never ceased to be attacked. In 2009, David Kaiser of 
the US Naval War College noted that  
 
[Carl von Clausewitz’s] On War is in one sense an optimistic book in so far 
as it holds out the model of rational policy controlling war at least as an ideal 
type to strive for in reality. As such it reflects the age in which it was written, 
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both intellectually (Clausewitz was a child of the Enlightenment) and 
politically since war, especially for Napoleon’s enemies, had genuinely in 
the end served rational political aims.87 
 
In his recent book, Christopher Coker has Clausewitz dismantling the big fads of the day – 
‘new wars’, ‘big data’, and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).88 Mary Kaldor asserts 
that ‘new wars’ (her term) can ‘only be defined in contrast to what went before and our 
understanding of what went before depends heavily on what we learn from reading 
[Clausewitz’s] On War.’89  
 
New Wars are the wars of the era of globalisation. Typically, they take place 
in areas where authoritarian states have been greatly weakened as a 
consequence of opening up to the rest of the world. In such contexts, the 
distinction between state and non-state, public and private, external and 
internal, economic and political, and even war and peace are breaking down. 
Moreover the [breakdown] of these binary distinctions is both a cause and a 
consequence of violence. 
 
New wars have a logic that is different from the logic of what I call ‘old wars’ 
- the idea of war that predominated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
In the original version of the argument, I derived this logic from the 
differences between old and new wars in actors, goals, methods and forms of 
finance.90 
 
‘Big data’ is important in modern national security applications as it involves data sets so large 
or complex that traditional data processing application software is now wholly inadequate. 
Indeed, as Kenneth Cukier, an author specialising in technology and society, notes: ‘The 
amount of digital information increases tenfold every five years. Moore’s law, which the 
computer industry now takes for granted, says that the processing power and storage capacity 
of computer chips double or their prices halve roughly every 18 months.’91 And, given the 
technological sophistication of modern warfare, the challenges for the consumer include 
capture, storage, analysis, data-sharing, information-transfer, visualisation, and data  security. 
The analysis of such sizeable data sets allows the consumer to identify correlative patterns in 
business, medicine, crime and warfare. Organisations such as the US Department of Defense, 
the United Nations, and the Central Intelligence Agency have all launched ‘big data’ initiatives, 
the goals of which are to predict and anticipate ‘political crises, disease outbreaks, economic 
instability, resource shortages, and natural disasters.’92 Whilst Clausewitz asserted that ‘War is 
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the realm of Chance’,93 some authors have asserted that the Revolution in Military Affairs had 
transformed war and relegated ‘chance’ to negligibility.94 RMA became a common, and much-
discussed, term in military, defence and academic circles in the early 1990s after the 1991 war 
against Iraq to liberate Kuwait had seemed to herald a fundamental shift in the nature of 
warfare.95 The RMA is rooted in the notion of a Military Revolution (MR), a term coined by 
the historian Michael Roberts in the 1950s, in connection with developments in 16th and 17th 
century Sweden.96  
 
Clausewitz recognised and acknowledged the utility of unifying theories. In On War he opined: 
‘Theory will have fulfilled its main task when it is used to analyze the constituent elements of 
war, to distinguish precisely what at first sight seems fused, to explain in full the properties of 
the means employed and to show the probable effects, to define clearly the nature of the ends 
in view, and to illuminate all phases of warfare in a thorough critical inquiry.’97 Such quotes 
are often used against him but, contrary to the opinions of many of his detractors, Clausewitz 
was no militarist (even though he was fascinated by war). War was something that resided, 
however unfortunately, in the human condition. The business of the strategist was to ameliorate 
the impact of this ‘very imperfect political instrument’,98 by seeking to minimise its duration 
and the effects on the society from which the strategist emerged. This necessitates a proper 
understanding of the relationship between political ends and military means in any given state 
and/or collection of states bound in alliance.    
 
No one starts a war-or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so-without first 
being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he 
intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter its 
operational objective. This is the governing principle which will set its 
course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make 
its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.99 
 
Winning requires a proper understanding of war. Clausewitz’s definition of war was crystal 
clear. ‘War therefore is an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.’100 This 
simple formulation belies the fact that there exists a variety of victories, and different modes 
of will and assorted clashes of combatant will.101 Clausewitz’s trinity casts the nature of war 
as the interplay of three fundamental elements: reason, passion, and chance. The expanding 
complexity of the world today incentivises the adoption of Clausewitzian analytical method 
(rather than the other way around). To attain victory, one must understand the relationships 
between these elements, the continuities and differences in war, and then see how they shape 
                                                 
93 Clausewitz, On War, p. 101. 
94 Richard J. Bailey Jr., ‘Four Dimensions to the Digital Debate: How Should We Think Strategically about 
Cyberspace and Cyberpower?’ in Richard J. Bailey Jr., James W. Forsyth Jr. and Mark O. Yeisley (eds), Strategy: 
Context and Adaptation from Archidamus to Airpower (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2016), p. 190. 
95 Michael J. Thompson, ‘Military Revolutions and Revolutions in Military Affairs: Accurate Descriptions of 
Change or Intellectual Constructs?’, Strata, 3 (2011), p. 82. On the history of RMA, see Geoffrey Parker, The 
Military Revolution, 1500-1800: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2nd edn. 1996); and MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds), The Dynamics of Military Revolution 
1320-2050 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
96 Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660: An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the Queen’s 
University of Belfast (Belfast: M. Boyd, 1956). RMA is now as widely accepted a concept as is MR. 
97 Clausewitz, On War, p. 141. 
98 Coker, Rebooting Clausewitz, p. 10. 
99 Clausewitz, On War, p. 579. 
100 Clausewitz, On War, p. 75.  
101 Coker, Rebooting Clausewitz, p. 34. 
14 | P a g e  
 
the conflict at hand. It all comes back to the need for a unifying theory of everything. In short, 
to know what kind of intelligence to collect, what type of strategy to design, you need a theory. 
Of Clausewitz’s universalism, Jon Sumida observes that ‘Clausewitz’s approach to theory may 
be seen not only in terms of how it might improve an individual’s decision-making capacity in 
war and politics, but also in terms of how it might be a pedagogical model applicable to the 
development of the ability to do anything that is difficult, complex, contingent, and 
dangerous.’102 As well as being a professional Prussian soldier, strategist and historian, 
Clausewitz was a product of the post-Enlightenment intellectual flowering of German 
Romanticism.103 On occasion, the creativity displayed by the German nation appeared 
boundless.104 The enduring value of this surge in creative thought was hardly transitory: to 
which the contemporary reputations of Clausewitz, Fichte, Goethe, Hegel, Heine, Herder, Kant 
(‘Clausewitz’s great inspiration’),105 Marx, Nietzsche, Schiller, and Schopenhauer are all 
testament. Clausewitz’s On War typified the deep philosophical bent in German scholarly and 
intellectual life. Indeed, as H.L. Mencken observed, ‘[it is] in the German universities…where, 
since [Martin] Luther’s day, all the world’s most painful thinking has been done’.106 Many 
modern institutions could learn from such a heritage. For instance: one of the biggest criticisms 
that the US Intelligence Community (IC) has faced recently is that it does not ‘do’ theory.107  
The IC needs to engage with interpretations of alternative trends, and pinpoint the degrees of 
plausibility of its evaluations, so that policy makers do not overestimate the degree to which 
the evidence supports the conclusions. This will clash with what Robert Jervis terms ‘[the 
policymaker’s] desire for greater certainty and the intelligence business model which now 
thrives on speed more than accuracy’.108  
 
In war, good intelligence is nearly always a prerequisite of victory. In late 2016 the retired US 
Army general Michael Flynn,109 then a Trump campaign adviser, was singing from the 
Clausewitzian hymn sheet when he stressed the necessity of aimed for population-centric 
information. Such sources may offer ‘few clues about where to find insurgents’, but they will 
‘provide elements of ever great strategic importance – a map for leveraging popular support 
and marginalizing the insurgency itself’.110 Matt C. Zeller, a US Army veteran of the Afghan 
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War, pithily terms counterinsurgency (COIN) as ‘a thinking man’s fight’.111 Coker has little 
time for approaches that reduce the conduct of war to simple perceptions about power that 
‘raid’ history merely for justificatory data. Context is everything, as it helps us attach value to 
the elements of the trinity of reason, passion, and chance.112 In and of itself, ‘big data’ collection 
cannot shed adequate light on emerging (and accelerating) patterns of social dynamism. This 
is the central problem with the Western way of war today. Pentagon planning for the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, for example, typified the flawed thought process whereby such powerful 
institutions think they have re-invented and tamed war.113 A year after the invasion, Yale 
University’s Paul Kennedy was forthright in his criticism of US policymakers.   
 
[I]t now appears that many army generals warned that maintaining law and 
order in Iraq would be much more difficult than simply ousting Saddam, that 
urban warfare would be horrible, and that casualties would rise. But the 
Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz114 team had no intention of listening to 
professionals - unless of course the soldiers agreed with their own rosy 
interpretation of how the war would go…[But] War is Hell [and as] 
Clausewitz so frequently warned, it rarely ends up where it was planned to 
conclude. This is something the neo-conservative strategists never thought 
about. Moral degeneration in war is something that the higher military 
leaders, although they worried that the post-battle situation would not be 
pleasant, did not anticipate.115 
 
Three years later, the Argentine academic José Fernández Vega deployed Immanuel Kant and 
Hannah Arendt to trace ‘Clausewitz’s concept of action back to that of judgement, an 
indispensable concept for the use of force by modern armies.’116 This led Vega to a depressing 
conclusion. 
 
The method that led to the [2003] war in Iraq was not the reflexive 
judgement, the Takt, the Kritik, the universal standpoint. It was rather 
imperialist arrogance. The West has all the military means to crush its 
enemies, but it had no clear policies left to continue the military victory. The 
military power of the United States is in theory unbeatable; but that 
supremacy has not yet come up with a viable and acceptable model of society 
for the countries it occupies or just bombs from the air. This is war without 
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politics; its faculty of imagination appears to be empty. In this way, violence 
becomes militarized and permanent.117 
 
Other cultures still fight differently from the Western (or the American) way of war. As war 
constantly mutates, vain attempts at disciplinary ‘gate-keeping’ of the definitions of the 
‘meaning of war’ will only put one at a potentially-lethal disadvantage. The idea of ‘new wars’ 
is based on such a fallacy, detracting from the complexity of the phenomenon.118  Once you 
start demarcating forms of ‘knowledge’, dismissing the Islamic State group (ISIS) as a 
throwback to the Medievalism becomes all too easy. In today’s turbulent world, digesting 
military history teaches us not to underestimate one’s enemies. Clausewitz knew this and it 
typifies the soundness of the philosophical tenets with which he sought to understand war.  
David Kaiser has argued that  
 
Clausewitz has provided the framework with which to analyze [the] problem 
[of how to use military means to achieve political ends], but the solution, as 
he understood so well, depends upon the correct appreciation of a multitude 
of political and military factors which he could not possibly have anticipated. 
The task of the political leader and the strategist – as in 1792, 1914, and 1965 
– begins anew. Success or failure depends upon the measure of political and 
military genius which they can bring to bear upon it.119  
 
A case in point being the adoption of an ambiguous view of Clausewitz on the issue of victory. 
Traditional takes on Clausewitz’s view of victory have argued that he more focused on military 
victory than anything else. But, in truth, Clausewitz’s views on this continued to evolve.120 The 
persistence of a universal interest in Clausewitzian thought makes his work of particular 
interest in China, for instance.121 Clausewitz’s assertions regarding the utility of force, and of 
the necessity of keeping political and military goals in close alignment continues to shape 
international politics.122 In 1986, Michael Handel asserted that ‘no theoretical text has yet 
surpassed…On War (1832) in its richness of wisdom and heuristic value.’123 In accord with 
this view, in 2009 David Kaiser asserted that ‘A new and very Clausewitzian drama has 
begun.’124 In the run-up to the Gulf War of 1991, General Colin Powell, testifying before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, stated that: ‘The fact that military planning must flow from 
clear political direction is not a new theory. Although we may have had to rediscover it in 
recent years, I think history will show that it drove [Generals] Eisenhower and Marshall and 
Pershing and Grant and Washington, and you can discover that theory in the works of 
Clausewitz.’125  In a recent assessment of a recently-published collection of Clausewitz’s works 
on small wars, Jack Levy recently noted that ‘Clausewitz attempted to develop a general theory 
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of war, one not bound by time and place, but one that could be usefully applied to the variety 
of conflicts in different historical eras.’ In this he was hugely successful.  
 
Those who dismiss the relevance of Clausewitz for understanding the low-
intensity conflicts of the contemporary era make the mistake of neglecting 
Clausewitz’s enduring trinity of forces (primordial violence, chance, and 
politics) and focusing instead on his analysis of the actors (people, army, and 
government) interacting with those forces in one period of time. In other 
periods, wars have centered around other kinds of political communities and 
organizations. It is hardly a surprise that Marxist–Leninists and theorists of 
insurgency and revolution view war in Clausewitzian terms as a continuation 
of the class struggle or the anti-imperialist struggle.126 
 
Clausewitz famously asserted that ‘Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing 
is difficult.’127 And Hew Strachan has identified the manner in which Clausewitz kept strategy 
as a clear and identifiable entity,128 without seeking to define policy. Clausewitz focussed on 
the nation and the state - not on party politics. Surveying matters in 2017, Clausewitz’s 
definition of strategy has the advantage of being that much more restricted than it is today.129 
A Universalist approach is essential in the practise of war. This is provided by On War and it 
is with good reason that Clausewitz remains required reading in military academies and 
universities worldwide.130 Even now, nearly two hundred years after his death, only a fool 
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